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Considerations in the Development of
a Scientific Social Work*
STANLEY L. WITKIN
SHIMON GOTTSCHALK

Florida State University
School of Social Work

A key issue in social work's struggle to develop a legitimate and distinct
knowledge base is the development of a scientific model suited to the
needs and objectives of the profession. Although various approaches
have been proposed, they have tended to dichotomize the issues into

one of science versus nonscience. In response to this situation, this
paper presents an integrative approach to the development of a scientific social work. In addition, it is argued that values can (and should)
be an integral part of a scientific approach and that they are legitimate

criteria for the evaluation of social theories.

During the last 25 years there has been increasing interest
in the application of scientific principles and research methodology to social welfare policy and social work practice. Faced
with a world of diminishing resources, accountability demands,
competitive professional groups, and client advocacy, social
workers have attempted to secure their legitimacy by increasing
the "scientific" dimension of their profession (e.g., Bloom, 1978;
Fischer, 1981; Karger, 1983). Through this same period, social
work's adherence to a set of values has continued as a principal
source of direction and guidance for those identifying with the
profession. While both science (as represented by social research) and social values are of great significance to social work,
they have often been portrayed as incompatible or discussed as
distinct and separate. This distinction is illustrated in the long
tradition of seeking a balance between science and art in social
work practice (Greenwood, 1955; Gyarfas, 1969; Thomas, 1967).
*An earlier version of this paper was presented in part at the annual meeting
of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, August, 1985, Washington, D.C.
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Within this tradition, science is assumed to be the source of
true knowledge and art the expression of skill and judgment.
In this paper we attempt to transcend this division by conceptualizing science as a cultural product (cf. Habermas, 1981;
Kuhn, 1970). From this perspective, social work research is
viewed as an expression of cultural, historical, and political factors. Consequently, an important task in the development of a
scientific social work is the explication and analysis of its underlying presuppositions and value positions. Based on this analysis, the compatibility between a particular scientific approach
and the objectives and values of social work can be assessed and
alternative conceptualizations considered.
A second manifestation of the attempt to develop a scientific
social work is seen in the debates between proponents of traditional research and those advocating alternative approaches
(e.g., Heinemann, 1981; Heinemann-Pieper, 1985; Hudson,
1982). While these debates have helped clarify the contrasting
arguments, the respective positions tend to be exclusionary rather
than integrative and the major points of contention simplified
to a choice between a scientific or nonscientifically based profession (See Mullen, 1985, for an exception). For instance, Wodarski
states, "The salient issue is whether social work practice should
be based upon data or upon a philosophy of life" (Wodarski,
1981, p. viii).
In our view, reducing these issues to an "either/or" question
creates an artificial bifurcation which obscures the important
contributions of different forms of social science inquiry. Furthermore, the failure to recognize these multiple "ways of
knowing" seriously retards the advancement of knowledge development in social work.
Social work and science are social endeavors influenced and
shaped by historical, cultural and political forces. Both interpret,
legitimize and implement certain values reflected in societal
ethos. Although science does not have an explicit value-promoting agenda, it tends to support and preserve the status quo
(Raskin & Bernstein, 1987). In contrast, social work is integrally
value-based and the expression of these values are a defining
feature of its mission. Moreover, rather than maintaining the
status quo, social work values encourage societal change to pro-
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mote greater individual freedom and social justice. If science is
to serve the needs of the profession (rather than the other way
around) there must be an accommodation to the important value
positions of social work.
The relationship between science and society is reciprocal.
The assumptions, theories, and methods of scientific systems
have important implications for societal beliefs, values and practices. In other words, science not only reflects the world, but
creates it. This balanced view can be incorporated into a social
work science by recognizing these implications as legitimate,
evaluative criteria. The example below illustrates this point.
Research on Handicapped Children
The traditional conceptual model utilized in research on
handicapped children defines their abilities in terms of their
deviation from the norms of able-bodied persons (Gleidman and
Roth, 1980). This deviance model leads to developmental research which focuses on how handicapped children differ from
their able-bodied counterparts, i.e., what they cannot do. Such
research produces data that "confirm" the deviation of these children and the "abnormal" way they are developing.
An alternative approach, more consistent with social justice,
would be to view development from the perspective of the handicapped child. That is, to see development in terms of the child's
unique capacities to adapt to different situations and expectancies. To the extent that certain handicapped persons share similar adaptive strategies, it may be possible to formulate a
developmental theory of these individuals. This theory would
be based on the perspectives, capabilities and adaptations of
disabled persons themselves rather than in terms of their deviation from a criterion group which popularly and scientifically
has been legitimized as normative. Moreover, a theory which
recognizes the legitimacy of different processes and forms of
adaptation (as opposed to seeing one as a deviation from the
other) is more likely to stress the capabilities and talents of persons rather than their so-called limitations.
The difference between the two models in the above example
is primarily conceptual rather than empirical. In fact, the same
empirical data could be used to support proponents of both
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perspectives. This is possible because the meaning of such data
is the result of cultural, moral and political assumptions which
cognitively precede the very statement of the research problem
and, therefore, usually remain implicit.
Although the truthfulness of these theories may be ambiguous, their social justice implications offer more clearcut choices.
A deviance model of handicap produces practitioners who view
the handicapped child as a small deviant and implement strategies designed to reduce this deviation (Gleidman and Roth,
1980). To the extent that these strategies are unrelated to the
developmental path of the child, her liberty is reduced. In contrast, a theory of handicap- grounded in the experiences of disabled individuals and consistent with social work values
recognizes the uniqueness of these persons as well as their right
to have the same basic choices as others.
It is important to note that generating scientific support for
this alternative view would also require expanding our conceptualization of legitimate methods. The research strategy would
have to allow, or even encourage, the active involvement of the
disabled person in the research process as well as extensive dialogue among all research participants (i.e., subjects and
investigators).
Science as Human Product
Science constitutes a systematic attempt to explain human
experience. It is an entirely human activity. Science does not
arise from nothing, but from what G. H. Mead termed "the
world that is there," (cited in Kaplan, 1964, p. 86) a world already colored by a complex web of assumptions, beliefs and
values, and by a particular structure of consciousness. Consequently, scientific truths will change not only because of direct
advances in the scientific enterprise, but also because of changes
in historical, cultural, and moral understandings.
All models of science are based on a set of taken-for-granted
assumptions, or ideologies, about the nature of "things" (ontology) and the criteria by which these things may be known (epistemology). These assumptions, which precede any and every
scientific undertaking, tend to be immune to validation by the
very epistemological criteria which the scientific model pro-

Scientific Social Work

poses. However, while the very ubiquity of these assumptions
render them somewhat transparent to the practicing researcher,
their impact can be far reaching.
At least two types of assumptions form the context of social
research: substantive assumptions and methodological assumptions. Substantive assumptions consist of implicit beliefs about
the general phenomena of interest (e.g., human behavior). They
provide researchers with a cognitive map of the content area
under investigation. Accordingly, this map helps researchers to
ask meaningful questions, discriminate data from "noise," interpret data, and discuss findings. For example, a study of malefemale differences may be based on several assumptions about
masculinity and femininity (their relationship to various psychological dimensions) that predispose researchers to ask questions and draw conclusions which confirm cultural stereotypes
(e.g., Morawski, 1985).
Methodological assumptions are a system of rules for conducting a legitimate (i.e., scientific) study. They constitute an
operational manual of methods consistent with the substantive
assumptions. Thus, in addition to knowing what questions to
ask, researchers know how to ask the questions (e.g., make inquiries in a way that does not reveal to subjects the true nature
of the research). Similarly, guidelines are provided on the proper
form of data, methods of data collection, and how to decide if
findings meet acceptable criteria.
The abstract substantive and methodological assumptions
which undergird social research and limit and shape its scope
are not restricted to a specific model or method of inquiry. They
are an inescapable starting point for diverse forms of inquiry
and have important implications for the development of
knowledge.
First, the scope and complexity of these world views (paradigms or metatheories) make their "objective" evaluation (in the
sense of simply pointing to data in agreement or disagreement
with them) impossible. Indeed, even what constitutes "data" is
dependent on theory. Additional nonepistemological criteria such
as the promotion of social justice are required (Witkin & Gottschalk, 1988).
Second, science is always interdependent with other areas
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of knowledge. At the very least, any view of science must include some notion about the relationship of science to nonscientific knowledge. These judgments are based in significant part
on existing core values and beliefs within a particular socialhistorical context. For example, calling astrological explanation
of human behavior unscientific, means that the evidential criteria of astrology do not pass the speaker's test of a "legitimate"
science (e.g., empirical data). This is not something which is
proven but accepted. In fact, until recently astrology was viewed
as a legitimate form of science. That our contemporary criticisms
benefit from the vantage point of historical and anthropological
hindsight makes our current science no less susceptible to
changes in future generations.
If science is interdependent with other areas of knowledge,
then it follows that the assessment of scientific beliefs must include their relationships to these other areas (Laudan, 1977).
Thus, while the current empirical status of a theory may be
invoked as one measure of its scientific adequacy (i.e., its truth),
it is equally rational to assess the theory in terms of its consistency with important and widely held "nonscientific" doctrines.
For example, despite the claims of researchers who point to racial
differences in I.Q. scores as the basis of a theory of the genetically-based, intellectual inferiority of one racial group relative to
another, such claims may be rejected justifiably not only on
methodological and substantive grounds, but because of their
inconsistency with crucial moral, religious and legal understandings in contemporary. Western society.
Those who would lay claim to the preeminence of scientific
"truth" in the case of I.Q. tests are making a political rather than
a scientific claim, i.e., these scientific procedures and their results should be evaluated socially as more important than contemporary concerns of social justice. This is a value laden choice;
it is an act of legitimizing the preeminence of technique over
informed judgment (Bittner, 1983).
The eighteenth century philosopher Leibniz formulated the
dictum, nihil est sine ratione, there is nothing without reason.
Inspired by this dictum, modem empirical science has set itself
the task of exploring the why, the calculable cause, of everything. An increasingly utilitarian and pragmatic Western world
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has largely excluded from its scientific understandings all concern for purpose and meaning, a realm traditionally assigned to
poets and novelists, not scientists (Kundera, 1985). To the extent
that this limitation is placed upon social science, and most especially social work research, it constitutes a denial of the valuebased, humanistic underpinnings of the profession.
Physical Science and Social Science
Important differences exist between the physical and social
sciences with respect to the phenomena investigated and the
effects of different research strategies on the results obtained.
Unlike the relatively immutable properties of most physical phenomena, (e.g., the molecular structure of wood) human social
life seems to be characterized by potentialities. That is, the meanings of such behavior are always numerous and equivocal. As
a result, the nature of the social reality which emerges is significantly determined by the focus and methods of the investigation. For example, a significant issue in marital research is
how to partition and analyze a couple's interaction (Rogers, Millar, and Bavelas, 1985). Researchers studying the same couple
but focusing on different units of analysis (e.g., individual utterances versus dyadic interchanges, or sentences versus "thought
units") define the interaction differently and may come up with
disparate results.
Put another way, a great deal of social science research generates the phenomena it claims to discover. It does this by imposing a particular conceptualization or structure on an
ambiguous array of potential activities. These activities create
the experiences discovered in investigations. Even such basic
categorical distinctions as internal-external can only be shown
to exist logically rather than empirically (Weick, 1977). Assigning
objects to such categories (e.g., an organization and its environment) represents only one way of organizing experience, other
ways may be equally possible.
The communication theorist, Paul Watzlawick (1976) has
pointed out that shuffling a deck of cards and turning them face
up one by one will reveal a pattern which, in most cases, will
be considered "random". If, after a thorough reshuffling, the
cards should appear in the order of ace through king according
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to their respective suits, one might suspect that some illegitimate tinkering has occurred to produce this obviously nonrandom pattern. Upon reflection, however, it becomes obvious that
this particular ordering is no more or less probable than any
other ordering of the 52 cards. The only difference is in the
special meaning assigned to the ace through king ordering. Similarly, observing and partitioning a pattern of behavior and calling it nonrandom (e.g., abnormal) is, in part, a function of the
meanings ascribed by the researcher and his or her method of
investigation.
Failure to recognize the equivocalness of social reality leads
social scientists into treating their categorizations as real and
studying the properties of the entities created by their partition.
A false sense of discovery may result due to the scientists'
"underestimation of the ways in which individuals contribute
to the worlds they think they see" (Weick, 1977, p. 278). This
position becomes restrictive if it leads to a lack of inquiry about
the existence of the categorization itself and the nonpursuit of
alternatives.
A number of related implications of this view have relevance
for this discussion. First, determining the truth or falsity of
propositions about human behavior is problematic. In fact it
may be that an overemphasis on right and wrong has hampered
our understanding of science in general (Laudan, 1977). Since
social phenomena are in part generated, rather than discovered,
by researchers, even competing theories can usually offer supporting data for their respective positions. Where differences in
such findings seem to exist, they can often be reinterpreted by
an alternative theory to mean something other than what the
original researcher intended (Gergen and Gergen, 1982) or the
research problem itself may be viewed as nonexistent or trivial.
Another reason for ambiguity about the truth status of competing theories is that complex social behavior appears to be
multiply determined as well as subject to multiple interpretations. For instance, confirming the presence of variable x in an
individual who seems depressed may not rule out the possible
presence of numerous other factors, some of which may be necessary for x to have nay impact on the individual's affective state.
Social scientists have been quick to recognize this situation,
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producing numerous studies which support their particular hypothesized determinants of behavior. Taken to its logical extreme, we would finally arrive at the point of concluding that
everything is related to everything else which, of course, tells
us nothing.
Recognition of science as a social product leads to the acknowledgement of truth as socially constructed. Differentiating
among competing theories therefore requires an awareness and
judgment of their differential moral and ethical implications, of
what is good and what is right (Rawls, 1971).
Developing a Social Work Science
The strong commitment of the profession to a basic set of
core values (Gottschalk, 1974) forms an important contextual
dimension against which social work research must be assessed.
The data rarely "speak for themselves." Rather, their meaning
and significance include a reference to values (Kaplan, 1964) as
well as a complex of culturally, historically and socially determined cognitive traditions.
Social workers are frequently faced with situations that require action based on moral and ethical principles. Should adult
children have the right to withhold essential medical treatment
from dying parents? Is it right for a social service program to
have restrictive eligibility criteria? Under what circumstances
should parental rights be abrogated? Questions such as these
are important for the practicing social worker as well as the
future course of social welfare policy. If the only legitimate approach to these questions is through a narrowly defined methodology, then these issues are likely to be distorted or ignored
as being outside the purview of legitimate science.
It has long been argued that value neutrality in social science
is a myth (Gouldner, 1963). Similarly, it has been our contention
that social science theory and methodology contain and support
ethical and ideological assumptions which have important social
implications. This does not mean, however, that since values
cannot be scientifically validated "anything goes". Truth may
not be the only criterion that should be considered in evaluating
our theories and hypotheses, but it should certainly not be discarded as an important yardstick (Homans, 1978). Furthermore,
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the communal nature of science requires that certain norms and
assessment criteria be employed to communicate information
and ideas.
A more sensible approach, in our opinion, is to broaden the
context within which various forms of science can conduct legitimate inquiry. A starting point might be to explicitly recognize the value implications of different perspectives. Thus instead
of futilely attempting to suppress values, the social work scientist can "confront more openly and honestly the valuational
implications of his or her work" (Gergen, 1978, p. 1365).
What must be added to all perspectives is an explication of
the ideologies implied or expressed by the models they employ
(Gottschalk and Witkin, 1988). Understanding these ideologies,
their impact on core social work values and the investigation of
new and revised forms of inquiry can help move the profession
towards a meaningful science and the development of a relevant
knowledge base.
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